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1 - 3 September | Vancouver, Canada BC
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The schedule is subject to change, so please check back before the event for the most up-to-date information.

Please note that all session times are listed below in Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), UTC-7.
Venue: Georgia Ballroom B clear filter
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Wednesday, September 2
 

09:00 PDT

Keynote: From Proof to Product: Why Formal Methods Is Finally Ready - Martin Dehnel-Wild, Chief Scientist, Kry10
Wednesday September 2, 2026 09:00 - 09:50 PDT
For most of its history, formal methods has been a discipline of proof rather than product: rigorous, powerful, and largely confined to academia. That is changing rapidly. I'll argue that FM is finally ready to deliver secure, resilient systems in the real world, and that the obstacles left are largely self-inflicted: a history of over-promising, tools that are painful to use and barely interoperate, and a habit of staying in the lab rather than supporting customers through real, evolving deployments.

Drawing on systems we're building today for a wide range of government and commercial partners, I'll make the case that security is fundamentally an economic argument rather than a quest for perfection: the goal is to make attacking a system so costly that adversaries focus elsewhere. Reaching that at scale depends far less on stronger proofs than on ruthless attention to wider adoption: on meeting real customers in the messy, changing environments they actually deploy into.

Regardless of your views on AI, it is rapidly lowering the barrier to entry. I'll show — not just tell — what becomes possible when modern AI is combined with formal tools and seL4. This is a talk for anyone who wants formal methods to matter beyond academia.
Speakers
avatar for Martin Dehnel-Wild

Martin Dehnel-Wild

Chief Scientist, Kry10
Dr Martin Dehnel-Wild is Chief Scientist of Kry10, where he leads R&D and heads up Kry10’s UK & European office. He has a DPhil (PhD) in Computer Science from the University of Oxford, where he researched interactive and automated theorem proving for security protocols. Prior to... Read More →
Wednesday September 2, 2026 09:00 - 09:50 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

09:50 PDT

Announcements - June Andronick, Proofcraft & seL4 Foundation
Wednesday September 2, 2026 09:50 - 10:00 PDT

Speakers
avatar for June Andronick

June Andronick

CEO, Proofcraft and seL4 Foundation
June Andronick is CEO and co-founder of Proofcraft, a company providing commercial support for software verification in general and the seL4 microkernel verification in particular. She is also CEO of the seL4 Foundation, and Adjunct Professor at UNSW Sydney. June has extensive leadership... Read More →
Wednesday September 2, 2026 09:50 - 10:00 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

10:30 PDT

Cyber-Hardened Satellite Software (CHSS) VMM - Robert VanVossen, Dornerworks
Wednesday September 2, 2026 10:30 - 11:00 PDT
MIT Lincoln Laboratory and the Space Cyber-Resiliency group at Air Force Research Laboratory-Space Vehicles Directorate (AFRL/RV) have created a software platform called Cyber-Hardened Satellite Software (CHSS). “CHSS is a mission-agnostic spaceflight software platform whose functionality was inspired by NASA’s core Flight System but with an emphasis on cyber-resiliency. Most notably, CHSS offers security without sacrificing performance.”1 CHSS utilizes Magnetite, which is a secure OS built on top of the seL4 Microkernel. Magnetite and CHSS components are written in Rust, which provides memory safety and type safety at the OS and application level. This stack provides a safe and secure foundation to create cyber-resilient satellite systems.

Adoption of new technologies, especially ones such as CHSS which are a paradigm shift in the way things have been done for satellites, can be quite difficult. AFRL/RV recognized that adoption should be made incremental to have the fastest transition. DornerWorks is working on a Phase II SBIR from SPACEWERX that addresses this in 2 ways:

1. Update VM Composer to target CHSS systems to make system configuration much simpler.

2. Write a VMM in Rust for CHSS to allow a VM to host legacy software which can be incrementally ported to CHSS.

VM Composer is a GUI tool for defining virtualized systems on top of seL4. By adding CHSS awareness to the tool, the manual steps for system integrators and developers can be significantly reduced. VM Composer is a way to visualize a system and architect security appropriate for mission risk acceptance.

The VMM provides a way to run the entire legacy code in a sandbox. It can be adapted to communicate with the overall CHSS system and then each app that needs to be cyberhardened can be ported over to CHSS and removed from the VM, one-by-one. Most importantly, the developer has a fully functional system at each step, allowing for incremental launches and deployments as the software is hardened. It also allows for lower criticality software to remain in the VM for deployment.

This talk will give further background on CHSS, discuss the progress that has been made in the two major tasks, and further discuss the iterative porting process of legacy satellite flight software and/or mission software.
Speakers
avatar for Robert VanVossen

Robert VanVossen

seL4 Technical Lead, Dornerworks

Wednesday September 2, 2026 10:30 - 11:00 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

11:00 PDT

Throwing seL4 on the Throwbot 3 Robot - Nathan Studer, Dornerworks
Wednesday September 2, 2026 11:00 - 11:15 PDT
The Throwbot® 3 Robot by ReconRobotics is a ruggedized, throwable micro-robot designed for rapid and covert reconnaissance in high-risk and dynamic environments. It is used by law enforcement and military personnel for real-time intelligence gathering, situational awareness, and remote investigation under control of a remote operator. Their light weight makes them ideal for many forward situations, but also vulnerable to being commandeered, carried off, and dissected.

Building on past and current work this talk will explain how seL4 can be used to increase the security posture of the underlying platform, further harden the control path, and add additional protections against the exfiltration of sensitive data. Following this overview, a demonstration of the modified system using seL4 will be given.
Speakers
avatar for Nathan Studer

Nathan Studer

Technical Strategy Lead, Dornerworks

Wednesday September 2, 2026 11:00 - 11:15 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

11:15 PDT

Assured Robotics Embedded Systems and Applications in Ground Vehicles (ARSENAL) - Dave Lide, Trusted Science and Technology with Additional Speakers To Be Announced
Wednesday September 2, 2026 11:15 - 11:30 PDT
The Robot Operating System (ROS) is widely adopted on various robotic platforms, including military robotic ground vehicles. However, it was not designed for performance and determinism requirements or for the safety and security required for the execution of critical missions. The Robotic Technology Kernel (RTK) is a ROS-based autonomy software library for S&T development that provides a set of common robotics capabilities across a variety of Army platforms. This RTK-over-ROS-over-Linux stack possesses the large resource overhead and attack surface manifested by Linux and its software applications such as ROS; hence an attacker may use a known vulnerability for Ubuntu to gain a footprint on the vehicle, causing disastrous consequences (e.g., crash). Unfortunately, unmanned ground vehicles, when running ROS, fundamentally lack the necessary security, resilience, and performance.

To tackle this challenge, Trusted ST is developing the Assured Robotics Embedded Systems and Applications in Ground Vehicles (ARSENAL) solution. The ARSENAL effort will result in a modular, open, and secure ROS2 stack (newer version of ROS that contains RTK) on military embedded platforms that will have the following capabilities.

- Enables multiple design and configuration options over the seL4 microkernel (as a separation kernel to provide software-level isolation) to support various platform resources and mission requirements (e.g., latency, space, throughput, etc.), which will significantly improve interoperability and configurability. ARSENAL can support the conventional ROS2 configuration with reduced attack surface (Option 1 with DDS and minimized Linux kernel on seL4), and minimized configuration (Option 2, DDS/ROS2 on seL4) to run mission applications with minimal platform resource requirements.
- Ports mission essential application modules over simplified DDS/ROS2 (Option 2) by leveraging ROS2/DDS interoperability and analyzing software dependencies, resource/performance requirements, and mission needs. The ported robotics application maintains mission critical functionalities (e.g., tele-operation) and eliminates non-mission critical functions (e.g., visualization) to reduce size and memory/latency overhead while fully leveraging DDS/ROS2 compatibility and supporting cross-platform, cross-controller capabilities.
- Provides strong security services and checks, including memory separation and process isolation, data flow monitor, intrusion detection, and policy enforcement to thwart known and unknown cyber vulnerabilities as applicable and needed in DoD use cases, including teleoperation, autonomy, and swarm.
- Enables secure inter- and intra-communication by providing cryptographic solutions on top of the open data transport layer (e.g., inter-process communication, or IPC, and data distribution service, or DDS). All data exchanges among multiple robotic applications within a platform and between external platforms can be encrypted with TLS to significantly increase the level of data and information protection.
We have performed design analyses and made design decisions; developed a proof-of-concept of running ROS2 in reduced OS (Option 1); and developed a proof-of-concept of running native ROS2 with DDS (Option 2). We will further develop and mature the technology, comprising four main thrusts: (1) completing the integration of DDS and ROS2 on top of seL4; (2) developing security capabilities; (3) upgrading software and tooling that includes transition from CAmkES to Microkit; and (4) performing capability demonstration.

The ARSENAL solution (1) takes advantage of open-source ROS2 and seL4 for cost-effective development and adoption, and (2) fully utilizes the deployed ROS2 stack in various UGVs for easy deployment and interoperability. ARSENAL will provide unprecedented, holistic security and resilience for Army UGVs, and therefore fundamentally improve the state of the art of the various autonomy stack and capabilities. Due to its open, modular, and standard-based design and implementation, the ARSENAL stack can be deployed on many unmanned systems to protect mission critical assets with minimal configuration changes.

We will present our seL4 experience and applications to build security and resilience for these unmanned systems in the real world, and therefore the talk proposal fits the scope of the seL4 Summit.
Speakers
DL

Dave Lide

Trusted Science and Technology

Wednesday September 2, 2026 11:15 - 11:30 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B
  General Session
  • about <br>

11:30 PDT

Evolving Legacy Systems Towards Strong Spatial and Temporal Isolation with seL4 - Philipp Scholl, ABB Corporate Research
Wednesday September 2, 2026 11:30 - 11:45 PDT
ABB develops protection and control systems for safety-critical infrastructure in energy and transportation sectors. These systems operate under hard real-time constraints, require security and safety assurances, and incorporate legacy software developed over decades by multiple teams across heterogeneous operating systems. Recently, regulatory requirements like the EU Cyber Resilience Act [1] demand timely and continuous software updates over long system lifetimes. This poses numerous challenges for the platform architecture and certification strategies.

The presentation reports on experiences gained while evaluating a mixed-criticality platform based on seL4 [2], [3]. The focus is on consolidating hard real-time, safety-critical protection and control functions with non-critical services on shared hardware, while preserving determinism and isolation. An architectural mechanism is also presented that enables software updates of non-safety-critical components without violating the isolation, timing, and trust assumptions of certified functions. This supports regulatory compliance while minimizing recertification effort. Based on this experience, the presentation discusses lessons learned, limitations, and open challenges encountered when implementing seL4 for such real-time, secured, and legacy-driven protection and control systems.

[1] Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.” 2024. Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj

[2] G. Klein et al., “seL4: Formal verification of an OS kernel,” 2009.

[3] Z. Kocsis, M. Paturel, S. Isitha, T. Weibel, and G. Heiser, “The Sel4 Microkit,” 2023.
Speakers
PS

Philipp Scholl

ABB Corporate Research

Wednesday September 2, 2026 11:30 - 11:45 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

11:45 PDT

tSDX - Reference Architecture for Software Defined X - Nils Brand, Fraunhofer IESE
Wednesday September 2, 2026 11:45 - 12:00 PDT
The demand for software-defined systems among businesses is growing rapidly. The software-defined paradigm has been known since the 1990s, originating in the telecommunications industry with software-defined radio. Since around 2021, innovation in the automotive industry has focused on implementing the software-defined vehicle paradigm. This led to the creation of COVESA, and in Europe, automakers and suppliers joined forces in the Eclipse Foundation for SDV. Other industries seeking to accelerate innovation in safety-critical systems—such as manufacturing, the defense industry, and aerospace—are now following this model.

Microkernels are well-suited as a central building block for implementing the Software-Defined Paradigm, as demonstrated annually at the seL4 Summit and reflected in over 275 million cars equipped with BlackBerry QNX.

To enable various industries to implement the Software-Defined Paradigm, Fraunhofer IESE is researching a reference architecture called: tSDX – trustworthy Software Defined X. The “tSDX” research project has been funded by the German Ministry of Research since May 2026 and initially aims to define an instantiable reference architecture with microkernels as its central building block. In a practical, application-oriented manner, requirements and architectural drivers from the defense industry, aviation, aerospace, and manufacturing are being gathered with the consortium. The reference architecture is intended to be vendor-neutral (microkernel-independent) and is currently still under development.

This presentation aims to convey initial insights and interim results. Furthermore, the presentation seeks to bridge the gap to practical application and present the needs and pain points of industrial applications to the participating microkernel experts.
Speakers
avatar for Nils Brand

Nils Brand

Research & Business Development, Fraunhofer IESE
Wednesday September 2, 2026 11:45 - 12:00 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

13:30 PDT

seL4's Security Proofs - Ryan Barry, Proofcraft Systems
Wednesday September 2, 2026 13:30 - 14:00 PDT
seL4’s flagship proof is functional correctness, which states that the C code behaves according to its abstract specification. This talk introduces the next layer in the assurance stack– seL4’s security proofs. We will present an overview of what they are, how they are structured, and where they fit into past, present, and future work at Proofcraft.

The CIA triad of properties– confidentiality, integrity, and availability– is the foundation of information security, and the target of seL4’s security proofs. These proofs establish that seL4’s specification, and by extension its implementation, prevents an application running on top from: modifying data without authorisation (integrity); interfering with another application’s resource access (availability); and learning information without authorisation (confidentiality). Together, the three guarantee isolation between applications in critical systems, preventing attacks and bugs in non-critical components from propagating to critical ones.

As part of a broader push towards a full proof stack for seL4 on 64-bit Arm, we recently extended the security proofs to AArch64. Among other architectural differences, this introduced two objects that were new to seL4’s security proofs: VCPUs, which provide virtual CPUs to guest operating systems under a hypervisor, and FPUs, which enable perthread floating point operations. Unlike other objects in memory, the contents of VCPUs and FPUs are loaded into physical registers whose contents may persist between context switches. This introduces new complexity in a security context, and required novel proof techniques to accommodate them.
Speakers
RB

Ryan Barry

Proofcraft Systems

Wednesday September 2, 2026 13:30 - 14:00 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

14:00 PDT

Trustworthy Systems R&D Update - Gernot Heiser, UNSW Sydney
Wednesday September 2, 2026 14:00 - 14:30 PDT
This talk will give an overview of the (systems) research and development activities at UNSW Sydney’s Trustworthy Systems (TS) group. It will provide the context for the other TS talks that follow, and will provide details of the activities not covered by separate talks, including:

- Microkit, driver framework and LionsOS progress
- performance analysis of the seL4 SMP kernel vs the multikernel
- re-establishing seL4’s worst-case execution time (WCET) analysis for the 64-bit MCS kernel on RISC-V
- establishing sound instruction-latency bounds for WCET analysis
- work on a clean model for IOMMU support
- ... and whatever exciting things that happened in the meantime.
Updates on verification work will be provided by Miki Tanaka and Rob Sison in their talks.
Speakers
avatar for Gernot Heiser

Gernot Heiser

Scientia Professor, UNSW Sydney

Wednesday September 2, 2026 14:00 - 14:30 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

14:30 PDT

Where are we with Time Protection? Verification and Cross-domain Communication Update - Rob Sison, UNSW Sydney
Wednesday September 2, 2026 14:30 - 15:00 PDT
This talk will give an update on the past two years’ advances at Trustworthy Systems in (1) our ongoing efforts to verify time protection for seL4, as well as (2) our implementation in seL4 of new time-protected cross-domain communication mechanisms on RISC-V Cheshire. On the formal verification front, I will present our results so far, thanks to a crucial rethink of our approach to verifying a key aspect of time protection for seL4 down to its C implementation, which has eliminated the main cause of the project’s previously large number of breakages to seL4’s existing correctness proofs. On the OS kernel design and development front, I will present both legacy and hardware-supported implementation options we evaluated for seL4 to support cross-domain shared memory and notification mechanisms that ensure one-way communications are truly one way, without permitting any timing channels in either (but most importantly, the backwards) direction. I will also remark on where we stand and next steps forward to formalise and verify that time protection is enforced by these new mechanisms.
Speakers
avatar for Rob Sison

Rob Sison

Senior Research Associate, UNSW Sydney
Rob is a postdoc at UNSW Sydney who researches and develops formal methods, primarily for proving absences of information flow in systems for high-assurance use cases. In the past, their focus was on complications arising from concurrency and refinement to enable secure compilation... Read More →
Wednesday September 2, 2026 14:30 - 15:00 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

15:30 PDT

Pancake Updates - Miki Tanaka, UNSW
Wednesday September 2, 2026 15:30 - 16:00 PDT
Pancake is a verification-friendly, imperative low-level language for systems programming, which the Trustworthy Systems group at UNSW has been working on to produce verified LionsOS components. Since first introduced in 2024 seL4 Summit, TS continued with Pancake development and Pancake is now mature enough for our systems engineers to take up and port various components originally written in C to Pancake.

In this talk, we report on various recent updates on Pancake and its roadmap, in the broader context of LionsOS. We’ll cover the progress and plans for the general Pancake language extensions and compiler improvements as well as verification of programs written in Pancake, in particular device drivers, both via interactive theorem proving and SMT-based tools.

We’ll highlight the SMT-based approach via Pancake-to-Viper transpiler as a way towards TS’s vision of making verified software the standard for security- and safety-critical systems, aiming to make software verification more scalable and less expensive.
Speakers
Wednesday September 2, 2026 15:30 - 16:00 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

16:00 PDT

Verifying seL4 device drivers with CN - Michal Podhradsky, Galois
Wednesday September 2, 2026 16:00 - 16:15 PDT
While sDDF provides a framework for verification of new drivers with the Pancake language, and driver synthesis, the vast majority of current systems relies on proprietary hardware, and existing drivers written in C.

In our project with DORNERWORKS we were tasked with verifying an ethernet driver for a deployed system. The ethernet device was similar to Intel e100 hardware. Given the relatively new sDDF framework and Pancake language, and the tight project timeline and budget constraints, we decided to verify an already existing driver, with CN verification tool.

CN was developed by The REMS group at University of Cambridge, and significantly matured during the PROVERS project. CN targets the C language, and lets users specify properties for the functions.

We were able to verify both the driver and a device model reverse engineered from the Intel driver datasheet. We had to stub out the seL4 system calls, including minimal specifications.

We believe this contribution bridges the gap between legacy drivers, and the future where drivers are synthesised and guaranteed to be correct.
Speakers
Wednesday September 2, 2026 16:00 - 16:15 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

16:15 PDT

Formalising Device Protocols for sDDF Driver Verification - Liam Murphy, UNSW Sydney
Wednesday September 2, 2026 16:15 - 16:45 PDT
Device drivers are a major source of bugs in operating systems, making them a primary target for formal verification. However, many of these bugs come from violations of the device’s protocol or faults in the device’s design, which cannot be prevented without a formal model of the device’s protocol. Such a model would traditionally be derived from the device’s datasheet, but the accuracy of this is limited, as datasheets are often incorrect and/or incomplete.

In this talk, we discuss how we leverage our open-source RISC-V SoC, Serengeti, to extract formally verified specifications from devices’ Verilog implementations, simultaneously establishing the absence of device faults. We also cover aspects of our application of these specifications to the verification of sDDF device drivers written in Pancake, with the goal of establishing end-to-end correctness.
Speakers
LM

Liam Murphy

UNSW Sydney

Wednesday September 2, 2026 16:15 - 16:45 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

16:45 PDT

Verification of a UDP Implementation: Challenges and Solutions - Alain Kägi, Lewis & Clark College
Wednesday September 2, 2026 16:45 - 17:00 PDT
In prior work, we have verified the correctness of a C implementation of UDPv6 using AutoCorres2, a tool to facilitate the verification of C programs in Isabelle/HOL. To achieve high performance, it is common practice for implementations of such network layers to make repeated small mutations to heap state, using typed pointers with overlapping address ranges. This approach to network implementations presents additional challenges for the verification efforts.

In this talk, we describe some of these challenges and present our solutions. First, rather than showing direct refinement to a high-level specification, we prove important invariants at the level of the C specification—a monadic representation of the C code generated by AutoCorres2. Second, we analyze pointer aliasing manually. Third, we generalize some of our lemmas both to simplify proofs of the UDPv6 implementation but also to use them towards proving properties about other layer implementations. Fourth, we refactor code where appropriate, while preserving performance, to simplify our proofs. Finally, we describe how we use these invariants to show refinement.
Speakers
avatar for Alain Kägi

Alain Kägi

Assistant Professor, Lewis & Clark College
Wednesday September 2, 2026 16:45 - 17:00 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B

17:00 PDT

Closing Remarks
Wednesday September 2, 2026 17:00 - 17:10 PDT

Wednesday September 2, 2026 17:00 - 17:10 PDT
Georgia Ballroom B
 
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